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Abstract 
 
Many investors confine their mutual fund holdings to a single fund family, either for 
simplicity or through restrictions placed by their retirement savings plan. We find 
evidence that mutual fund returns are more closely correlated within fund families, which 
reduces the benefits of investor diversification. The increased correlation is due primarily 
to common stock holdings, but is also more generally related to families having similar 
exposures to economic sectors or industries. Fund families also show a propensity to 
focus on high risk or low risk strategies, which leads to a greater dispersion of risk across 
restricted investors. 
                                                 
∗ Elton, eelton@stern.nyu.edu, and Gruber, mgruber@stern.nyu.edu, are Nomura Professors of Finance at 
the Stern School of Business at New York University. Green, clifton.green@emory.edu, is Assistant 
Professor of Finance at Goizueta Business School, Emory University. 
Individuals frequently place all of their mutual fund investments with one family of 
mutual funds. Employer sponsored retirement plans often necessitate this behavior by 
limiting fund choices to the offerings of a single family.1 Load fees, which are typically 
not charged when moving switching funds within a family, also encourage family loyalty. 
On a more basic level, investors may restrict their attention to one family to help narrow 
the search process and simplify record keeping. In this article, we examine whether the 
propensity of investors to confine their investments to a single fund family influences the 
risk characteristics of their portfolios. 
There are several reasons to expect that funds may be more similar inside than 
outside fund families. Portfolio managers within families are likely to have access to the 
same research analysis produced either by internal analysts or by a particular set of 
external research firms. Many families also have a prescribed investment style that 
influences the type of securities they hold. A common view on individual companies 
could lead to similar stock holdings across portfolios with even different objectives. In 
addition, a family’s relationship with an investment brokerage firm could also lead to 
common holdings of new offerings. 
Fund similarities within families may also arise from macro level influences. 
Portfolio managers may begin the security selection process with an economic forecast 
that is shared by other fund managers within the firm. For example, a family’s portfolio 
managers may sit on a strategy committee that shares insights regarding the overall 
economy. A common family-wide economic outlook could result in similar exposures to 
various economic sectors. Commonalities related to both sectors and individual securities 
will be greater whenever one portfolio management team manages multiple funds within 
a family. 
                                                 
1 For example, Elton, Gruber and Blake (2004) study over six hundred 401K plans and find that most 
restrict fund choices to one family. 
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In this study we study the size and determinants of increased fund return 
correlations within families. The influence that family membership can have on fund 
returns can be illustrated by considering the Eaton Vance Special Equities Fund and 
Eaton Vance Tax Managed Small Cap Growth Fund. The Investment Company Data Inc. 
(ICDI) classifies the special equity fund as Aggressive Growth and the small cap fund as 
Long-Term Growth. They have separate prospectuses and are categorized on the family’s 
web site in different groups of funds. The prospectus of the Special Equities Fund states 
the objective as “Growth in Capital” whereas the Managed Small Cap Growth Fund’s 
stated objective is “A diversified fund seeking long-term after-tax returns by investing in 
emerging growth companies.” 
An investor looking at standard materials from Eaton Vance would have little 
reason to believe the funds were similar. However, the correlation between their monthly 
returns over a five-year period is 0.995. Both funds employ the same portfolio manager. 
The rank order of the major holdings in the two funds is the same, with only small 
differences in percentages invested. The rank order of the amount invested in each 
economic sector is the same, with only small differences in the percentages invested in 
any sector. Thus, an investor hoping to diversify by buying shares of both funds would be 
disappointed with the resulting risk profile. 
Our analysis suggests that investors who limit their investments to one fund 
family hold riskier portfolios than those who diversify across families. Both within and 
across objectives, fund return correlations are significantly higher inside than outside 
fund families. An examination of fund holdings, combined with a factor model to 
characterize fund returns, reveals that roughly two thirds of the increase in return 
correlation is related to common stock holdings with the rest attributable to similar 
exposures to broad economic factors. The extent of overlap in stock holdings is 
surprising. Depending on the objective group being considered, as much as 34% of total 
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net assets consists of stocks held in common, with an across-objective median of 17% 
inside the family compared to 8% outside the family. 
 We also find evidence that fund families show a propensity to focus on either high 
risk or low risk strategies. Within each objective, families are significantly more likely to 
have funds with standard deviations higher or lower than the median standard deviation 
for that classification. While this phenomenon does not increase the risk of an average 
investor’s portfolio, it does increase the distribution of risk across investors. The 
increased dispersion raises the probability of having very high risk by investing 
exclusively in one family. Taken together, our results indicate that confining mutual fund 
investments to one family has a detrimental effect on investor risk that is statistically and 
economically meaningful. Portfolios of funds within families result in greater overall risk 
and greater risk clustering than similar portfolios created from funds across families. 
 Massa (2003) and Mamaysky and Spiegel (2001) develop models of the mutual 
fund industry in which investors’ heterogeneous tastes provide incentives for families to 
compete through product differentiation. These studies, as well as Khorana, and Servaes 
(2003), offer empirical evidence that families increase market share by adding funds with 
different objectives.2 Our findings indicate that fund proliferation within families does 
not provide the same level of diversification benefits as combining funds across families. 
 The paper is organized as follows: Section I discusses the sample and the data 
sources we use in the study. Section II examines the correlation between fund returns 
within and between fund families, where funds are grouped according to standard 
objective classifications. In Section III we begin our examination of the determinants of 
the increased correlation by applying factor models to remove the impact of various 
economic sectors. This allows us to examine return correlation due to sector and security 
                                                 
2 In other research on fund families, Ivkovich (2001) and Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2003) find evidence 
that outperforming funds have spillover effects on family cash inflows. Das and Sundaram (2002) study the 
impact of different fee structures on investor welfare. 
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bets as opposed to macro market bets. Section IV examines the actual security holdings 
of funds to examine the extent to which higher correlation within a fund family is due to 
holding the same securities. In Section V we study the propensity of families to engage in 
high or low risk strategies by studying similarities in fund standard deviations. Section VI 
offers conclusions and implications for investors. 
1. The Data 
 The principal source of our data is the CRSP Mutual Fund Database.3 Our initial 
sample is all fund families that existed in January 1998 and the mutual funds that were 
part of these families.  We use objective classifications from Investment Company Data 
Inc. (ICDI) to categorize funds and eliminate the following: specialized funds, index 
funds, international funds, money market funds, single state municipal funds, precious 
metal funds, sector, and utility funds. This left us with funds in eleven ICDI objective 
categories. From this list we eliminate duplicate funds (versions of the fund that differ 
only in the expenses charged), which are of two varieties. First, many funds have 
multiple share classes related to different fee structures and we eliminate all but the class 
with the longest history. Second, many families offer the same fund to institutional 
investors or to financial planners under different names, and we eliminate the duplicate 
funds. Finally, we perform a detailed examination of pairs of funds that were highly 
correlated to ensure that duplicate funds are removed from the sample. 
 After removing duplicate funds, we then eliminate all fund families with a single 
remaining fund. For this remaining set of families we draw a final sample by randomly 
selecting one in three fund families while maintaining the same distribution of families in 
terms of the number of mutual funds offered. The resulting sample consists of 988 unique 
                                                 
3 CRSP database suffers from omission bias, a form of survivorship bias. See Elton, Gruber and Blake 
(2001). Survivorship bias is not important for this study because we are looking at diversification at a point 
in time and we have data on all funds at that time. 
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funds from 100 different families. Table 1 shows the number of funds within four broad 
objective categories (stock, combination, high-yield, and bond), and eleven 
subcategories.4 The vast majority of families offer a stock fund, either aggressive and/or 
long-term growth. Most families also offer at least one combination fund and one bond 
fund. Across objectives, the median number of funds per family is six. The largest family 
in the sample had 85 distinctly different funds. 
For each fund we draw monthly returns for up to five years starting January 1998. 
In what follows, if a fund ceased to exist we calculated correlations over the common 
period (none had less than a year’s data). In addition to data on fund families and returns, 
we also collect data on fund stock holdings from Thompson Financial Services’ Mutual 
Fund Holdings database. We obtain portfolio holdings for funds that report their holdings 
for December of 2000. 
II.  Correlation Within and Between Fund Families 
 The first attribute of fund family risk we explore is fund return correlation. We 
calculate correlations for each pair-wise combination of fund objectives. Specifically, for 
each fund within a fund family we compute the correlations with all other funds in the 
family with a given objective and the correlation with funds outside the family with the 
same objective. For example, when calculating the average correlation within the family 
between aggressive growth and long-term growth funds, we also calculate the average 
correlation between an aggressive growth (long-term growth) fund within a family and 
long-term growth (aggressive growth) fund from outside the family. We then average 
these results across all families. We calculate statistical significance using two methods: a 
                                                 
4 Subsequently, the aggregate classification “stock” will refer to funds with aggressive growth or long-term 
growth ICDI objectives; “combination” will refer to funds with both stocks and bonds in their portfolios as 
designated by the objectives Total Return, Growth and Income, Balanced, and Income; and “bond” will 
refer to Ginnie Mae, High Quality Bond, High Quality Municipal Bond, or Government Securities funds.  
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two-sample t-test of difference in mean correlations, and a one-sided binomial test that 
the proportion of families with greater within-family correlations is greater than 0.5. 
 The results are presented in Table 2. The table documents a pattern of increased 
correlation with families. For example, consider combining a stock fund with a 
combination fund. The fifth row of Table 2 shows that 78 fund families offered at least 
one stock fund and one combination fund. The average correlation between stock funds 
and combination funds is 0.757 if they are inside a family and 0.709 if they are from two 
separate families. For 67% of the families, selecting stock and combination funds from 
inside the family results in a higher correlation than selecting from two different families. 
 For each of the broad objective pairs shown in Table 2, within-family correlations 
are higher than between-family correlations.5 Combining funds into stock-stock, 
combination-combination, and stock-combination pairs results in statistically significant 
higher return correlations within families than outside families using both t-tests and the 
binomial test. The influence of fund families on return correlations is weaker among bond 
funds. None of the correlations involving bond funds are statistically significant 
according to t-tests. 
 When funds are grouped according to more narrowly defined objectives, we find 
fourteen of the correlation differences are statistically higher within families at the one 
percent level using the t-test. Using the binomial test, eleven are statistically significant at 
the one percent level and fifteen are significant at the five percent level. The results for 
bond funds remain weak after partitioning funds into the more narrowly defined objective 
categories. 
 The correlations reported in Table 2 are generally reasonable in magnitude. The 
correlation between two stocks funds is higher than the correlation between a stock and a 
                                                 
5 In the interest of space we omit several groupings with a smaller likelihood of commonality, such as 
Ginnie Mae–Aggressive Growth. In general the omitted objective pairs show higher correlation inside than 
outside families, although the differences tend to be small and none are statistically different from zero. 
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combination fund, which in turn is higher than the correlation between a stock and a high 
yield bond fund, which is higher than the correlation between a stock and a bond fund. 
The high correlation between combination funds is somewhat surprising. We show later 
that combination funds hold the highest percentage of stocks in common both for funds 
inside and outside the family, which may reflect a similar equity objective (stability of 
return). The high correlation among high yield bond funds is also intuitive, due to the 
relative homogeneity of strategy across funds. The correlation between bond and stock 
funds and bond funds and combination funds is negative, reflecting the correlation 
between stocks and bonds during the sample period. 
 As a robustness check, we examine whether the results are sensitive to the method 
used to classify objectives. Brown and Goetzmann (1997) find evidence that funds 
classify their objective in a strategic way that reduces the accuracy of reported 
classifications. Although this is less of a concern for our broad objective measures, we 
also group funds into eleven style categories based on cluster analysis approach similar to 
Brown and Goetzmann (1997). Although some of the funds are reshuffled into different 
categories, the difference in correlations within and between groups are very similar to 
the results shown in Tables 2 and are not reported for brevity. We also examine whether 
the correlation differences are sensitive to the size of the family. Grouping families into 
categories based on the number of funds in the family results in positive correlation 
differences for each group, with no significant differences between them. 
 In order to evaluate the economic significance of the higher correlation within 
families, we consider the following exercise. Assume an investor holds a fund with a 
particular objective, and she is considering adding one or two new funds to her portfolio.6 
The investor can add these funds from inside or outside the fund family. For each new 
outside fund, we calculate the number of new inside funds that would need to be added to 
                                                 
6 The Investment Company Institute reports that the median (mean) number of stock funds held by 
individual investors in 2002 is 3 (5). 
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arrive at the same level of portfolio risk. We make two simplifying assumptions. We first 
assume that equal amounts are invested in each fund. This 1  approach has empirical 
support in the studies of Benartzi and Thaler (2001) and Liang and Weisbenner (2002). 
Our second simplifying assumption is that all funds within an objective classification 
have the same variance, which we measure as the average across all funds with that 
objective. We then apply the standard formula for portfolio variance: 
N/
  
2 2
2 2
1 1 1
1N N N
p i
i i j
j i
N N= = =≠
   = +      ∑ ∑∑
1
ijσ σ σ , (1) 
where N is the number of funds,  is the variance of the portfolio,  is the average 
fund variance, and 
2
pσ 2iσ
ijσ  is the average covariance between funds. 
 Let N  be the number of funds currently held and  be the number of funds to 
be added. Let 
1 2N
Fρ  be the correlation between the funds that are currently within the 
portfolio and Nρ  be the correlation for the new funds, which takes on a different value 
depending on whether the new funds are from inside or outside the family (taken from 
Table 2). If the new funds are added from the same objective, Equation (1) simplifies to: 
 ( ) ( )
2
2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 1p i F N NN N N N N NN N N N
    = + − + + −   + +   
σ σ ρ ρ ρ  (2) 
If the funds added are in different classifications (e.g., combination being added to stock), 
then no informative simplified formula is available and equation (1) is used directly. 
 The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3. The table makes it clear that 
diversification within a fund family is less advantageous than diversification across 
families. If an investor owned one stock fund and was considering adding two more 
funds outside the family, she would have to add four internal stock funds to ensure the 
portfolio was not more risky.  The results for the other groupings have the same pattern. 
When adding two combination funds to an existing combination fund, the investor would 
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have to add 17 funds inside the family to achieve the same level of risk as adding two 
funds outside the family. Taken together, the evidence suggests that investors or savings 
plans that limit investment to one fund family is giving up a significant amount of the 
benefits of diversification. 
III. What explains the higher correlation? 
In this section we use a number of diagnostic approaches to examine the portfolio 
management activities that lead to the increased fund return correlation within families. 
We begin with a macro level approach. If portfolio managers within a family begin the 
security selection process with a shared economic forecast, we may expect similar 
exposures to different economic factors. We examine this hypothesis with a number of 
multi-index models, beginning with a two-factor model. 
A. Two-Index Model – Sensitivity to Bonds and Stocks 
 Combination funds own both bonds and stocks, stock funds frequently own some 
bonds, and bond funds often contain some securities with stock-like attributes. Thus, we 
begin with a two-index model where stock returns are measured using the value weighted 
CRSP index and bond returns are measured using the Merrill Lynch aggregate U.S. 
Corp/Gov/Mortgage bond index. For each fund in our sample we estimate a least squares 
regression on five years of monthly data to estimate the following relationship:7 
   ( ) ( )i F i is s F iB B F iR R B R R B R R− = α + − + − + e  (3) 
Where  is the return of fund i,  is the riskless rate,  is the return on the stock 
index,  is the return on the bond index,  and  are the sensitivity of fund returns 
to the stock and bond index, 
iR
BR
FR MR
isB iBB
iα  is the non-market return, and  is a random error. Under 
the two-index model, the correlation between two funds, i and j is given by: 
ie
                                                 
7  For the regressions we require the fund to have at least 36 monthly return observations. 
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( ) ( )2 2cov cov( ) cov( )i j is js s iB jS iS jB iB jB B i j
i j i j
R R B B B B SB B B SB B B E e e+ + + += σ σσ σ σ σ  (4) 
where 2Sσ  and 2Bσ  are the variance of the stock and bond indexes and cov(SB) is the 
covariance between indexes, 2iσ  and 2jσ  are the standard deviation of funds i and j, and 
( )jieeE  is the covariance of the fund return residuals. 
 The above expression separates the correlation between funds into two parts, the 
correlation due to systematic movements and the part due to residual movements. This 
decomposition allows us to examine how much of the higher correlation within a family 
is due to systematic market effects and how much is due to residual effects. Residual 
correlation can come about because two funds hold the same securities or because they 
are sensitive to similar factors not captured by the two-factor model. For example, a 
family may employ similar style choices such as emphasizing small stocks or large stocks 
or have a similar sensitivity to a particular industry factor such as technology stocks. 
An increase in systematic correlation would come about if funds in the same 
family have similar portfolio sensitivities to bonds and stocks. For example, if the 
average combination fund is equally invested in stocks and bonds, but a particular family 
chooses to hold 70% in bonds, we would expect to observe higher systematic within-
family correlation. The average difference in within-family correlation compared to 
between-family correlation due to residual correlation is the difference in the value of 
( )i j i jE e e σ σ  for the two groups. 
 In Table 4 we examine the within- and between-family correlation due to residual 
commonality for the pairs of objectives where within-family correlation is higher than 
between-family correlation at a statistically significant level. We start by examining the 
aggregate groups from Table 2, for the two-index model. As shown in Table 4, Panel A 
the contribution to overall correlation from residual correlation is higher for two funds in 
the same family than when funds are in the two different families. The differences in 
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residual correlation are significant for the same three broad objective cases (stock-stock, 
stock-combination, and combination-combination) where difference in overall correlation 
were significant in Table 2. If one compares the differences in correlation in Table 4 with 
the differences in correlation in Table 2, then it is apparent that the higher overall within-
family correlation is almost completely due to higher residual correlation. For the three 
aggregate pairs where the differences are significant the percentage of the overall 
differences in correlation due to differences in residual correlation are 110% (stock-
stock), 100% (stock-combination, 104.3% (combination-combination). 
 A similar pattern exists for the more narrowly defined objective categories. The 
residual correlation accounts for more than 80% of the difference in within-family and 
between-family correlation except for aggressive growth with growth and income (where 
it accounts for 66%), long-term growth with growth and income (75%), and balanced 
with balanced (48%). Note that the only pairings where systematic influences have an 
important influence on correlation differences are pairings involving combination funds. 
This implies that one of the reasons these funds have higher within-family correlation is 
that they make similar choices concerning the split between stocks and bonds. 
B. Multi-Index Models 
 Panel B of Table 4 shows the results for a six-factor model, which adds the Fama-
French size and value factors (Fama and French, 1992), and decomposes the bond factor 
into three separate bond indexes (government, mortgage-backed, and high yield). The 
table indicates that higher residual correlation within a family is still an important 
component of the overall increase in correlation, but its relative importance falls. For the 
four cases shown in Table 2 where within-family correlation was significantly higher 
than between-family correlation, the percentage of the overall difference due to residual 
correlation from a six-index model was 78% (stock-stock), 48.3% (stock-combination), 
58.7% (combination-combination), or an average of 62%. Comparing Panels A and B, 
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about 41% of the difference in the percentage of overall difference in the residual 
correlation between within- and between-family funds is explained by common factors 
beyond market factors. 
 The same general pattern exists when we use the more narrowly defined ICDI 
classifications. When pairing aggressive growth with aggressive growth, 81% of the 
additional correlation within families is due to residual correlation. When grouping 
aggressive growth with growth and income, 36% is due to residual correlation, and when 
grouping balanced with balanced, 33% is due to residual correlation. For the remaining 
categories, roughly 50% of the difference in correlation is due to residual risk. While 
some of the increased correlation is due to a common sensitivity to non-market factors, 
the residual is still an important component.8 
 If we have successfully captured all of the relevant factors, then the remaining 
correlation in residuals is due to common holdings. In addition, some of the effect of 
common holdings may be captured in the loadings to non-market factors. Thus, it is 
worthwhile to examine the effect of common holdings directly. 
IV. Common Holdings 
 We now examine the extent to which common holdings of individual stocks 
translate into increased return correlations within fund families. We first document the 
amount of common holdings and then relate this to fund return correlations. 
A. Difference in Common Holdings 
 The first question to examine is whether funds in the same family hold more 
securities in common than funds in different families. The simplest measure of common 
                                                 
8 We also fit an eight-factor model that uses five industry portfolios and the three bond indexes and find 
similar results. 
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holdings for two funds is to sum the minimum fraction of the portfolio held in any stock i 
between the two funds or: 
   ( )COM( , ) min ,Ai BiiA B X X= ∑ . (5) 
where  is the fraction of fund A’s portfolio invested in stock i, and  is the fraction 
of fund B’s portfolio invested in stock i. 
AiX BiX
 For most mutual funds included in the Thompson Financial database, the 
aggregate amount invested in stocks does not equal 100% of total net assets. The 
principal reason for this is that most mutual funds hold some cash. Certain mutual funds 
such as balanced funds may hold a large fraction of their assets in bonds and the 
Thompson database only includes stock holdings. A second possible reason is that some 
small stock holdings may not be included in the Thompson database. Equation (5) can 
understate the impact of common holdings for it assumes that there is no impact from 
common stocks omitted from the Thompson database and there is no impact (extra 
correlation) due to bonds held in common. The effect of these omissions on return 
correlations should be small, both because the Thompson database contains a large 
fraction of common stock holdings and because the correlation between pairs of bonds is 
so high that common holdings does not cause much of an increase in correlation. The 
reason for this will be clear shortly when we examine how common holdings affect 
correlation. 
Nevertheless, in order to clarify the extent of common holdings, we formulate a 
second measure that expresses the holdings as a fraction of the total identifiable amount 
of common stock held in the portfolio so the percentages add to 100% as follows: 
   ( )COM , min ,Ai Bii
Ai B
X X
A B
X X
 ′ =  ∑ ∑ ∑ i   (6) 
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 Which of these measures is more accurate depends on the proportion of holdings, 
whether bonds or stocks, not shown in the Thompson database that are held in common. 
If the only securities held in common are those listed in the Thompson database, then the 
first measure is accurate. If the portion of securities held in common for those omitted 
from the Thompson database is the same as the portion of stocks held in common for 
those included in the Thompson database, then the second measure is an accurate 
measure of common holdings. Both of the measures can be calculated for funds inside the 
family and funds outside the family. 
 The results are shown in Table 5. The table shows the common holdings for all 
stock and combination funds combined and for each of the subcategories.9 Examining 
Panel A of Table 5 reveals (even under our conservative measure of common holdings) a 
surprisingly high level of common holdings and a larger increase in common holdings 
when one compares within-family funds with outside funds. Starting with the aggregate 
comparison, we see that within families the grouping stock-stock has 13.3% of the 
portfolio in common, for stock-combination groupings the overlap is 14.9%, and for 
combination-combination it is 27.4%. Furthermore, all of these percentages are more than 
twice as large as the percentages of common holdings in the same category when a fund 
inside the family is compared to a fund outside the family, and all of the differences are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 When we examine the more narrowly defined objectives we see similar overall 
results. In all cases, funds in the same family hold more stocks in common than funds 
outside the family. Nine of the 14 combinations are statistically significant.. Panel B 
documents the same pattern of results. The logical question to ask is how much of the 
                                                 
9 We lose some observations due to an insufficient match of TNA/fund name between CRSP and Thomson. 
The table omits the Balance-Balance and Total Return-Total Return groupings due to insufficient number 
of observations. 
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increased holdings correlation between funds in the same family is due to this 
phenomenon. 
B. Impact of Common Holdings on Correlation  
 If we assume for the moment that the variance of all stocks can be reasonably 
represented by a single number CVAR and that the covariance between pairs of stocks can 
be represented by a single number CCOV, then we can express the covariance between 
two funds which hold only stocks but hold some securities in common as:  
   CO ( )
1 1
V ,
N N
A B Ai Bi Ai Bi
i S i j
j i
R R X X CVAR X X CCOV
∈ = =≠
= +∑ ∑∑  (7) 
Where S is the set of all stocks held in common. Note that the first term shows the impact 
on covariance when two stocks are held in common, and the second term when they are 
different stocks.10 For all stocks not held in common either  or  must be equal to 
zero. Thus we can write the equation as: 
AiX BiX
  
( ) [ ]
1 1
COV ,
-
N N
A B Ai Bi Ai Bi
i S i jA B A B A B
R R X X X X
CVAR CCOV CCOV
∈ = =
= +∑ ∑∑σ σ σ σ σ σ  (8) 
Note that this equation holds assuming that the correlation between fund A and fund B is 
only due to correlation between known common holdings. Since we only have 
information on stock holdings, we underestimate the effect on common holdings for 
funds which have bonds in their portfolio or where small holdings of stocks are left out. 
However, since pairs of bonds should be highly correlated, the difference between 
variance and covariance is small and examining the first term of equation (8) shows the 
                                                 
10  The covariance between two stocks is ij i jρ σ σ . If they are held in common,  and 1ijρ = i jσ σ=  and 
the covariance becomes the variance. 
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impact on portfolio correlation should be small. Thus, we will only present data assuming 
we have all the common holdings. 
 The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (8) represents the contribution of 
common holdings to the correlation between fund A and fund B. We compute the average 
for this statistic when fund A and fund B are in the same family, and a second average for 
the case where they are in different families. We then take the difference in this ratio and 
divide it first by the total correlation difference and second by the residual correlation 
from the one-index model (similar to the number in Table 4).11 The first represents the 
fraction of the difference in correlation between funds in the same family and funds not 
in the same family that is due to the difference in common holdings. 
 The results are reported in Table 6. Common stock holdings account for 44% of 
stock-stock, 43% of stock-combination, and 89% of combination-combination correlation 
differences when we use our conservative estimate of common holdings. The estimates 
using the narrowly defined objective groupings show a similar pattern. The smallest ratio 
of correlation difference related to common holdings is 27%. Overall, common holdings 
explain roughly 50% of the difference between the correlation in fund returns (as well as 
residual fund returns) for funds inside and outside the family. 
V. Differences in Variance Across Fund Families 
 In addition to increased fund return correlation, limiting investments to one family 
may also result in a greater dispersion of risk across investors. If several funds within a 
family share a similar strategy, we might expect fund variances not to be randomly 
distributed across families. Thus, if investors are restricted to one family, then similar 
strategies within families would cause a greater dispersion of investor risk than if high- 
and low-variance funds were randomly dispersed across fund families. 
                                                 
11 The correlation numbers are not identical to those in Table 4 due to the omission of funds without a 
sufficient match between CRSP and Thomson. 
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 We measure the propensity of families to choose high risk or low risk strategies 
by constructing a binomial test.12 We begin by calculating the median standard deviation 
for each of the ICDI categories. We then label all funds with standard deviations above 
(below) the median for that objective as HIGH (LOW). We then examine whether the 
distribution of HIGHs and LOWs within fund families is different from that expected by 
chance. 
 Define ,g hY  as the number of HIGHs obtained for fund family h when there are g 
funds in family h, and let ( )2. , 1/ 2g h g h g= −T Y . If the assignment of high and low 
variance funds to a fund family is random, then we would expect on average for a fund 
family to have 2g  HIGHs. Thus, ,g hT  becomes large if high risk funds are concentration 
in some families while low risk funds are concentrated in others. If the distribution of 
HIGHs and LOWs within a family is random, then under the null then Yg,h are 
independent binomial (g, 12 ) random variables and the test statistic ,g hT  has the following 
moments: 
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 = × + × − × − × 
−=
 (9) 
Letting H be the total number of fund families and gh be the number of funds in family h, 
we can test risk clustering using the following normally distributed test statistic: 
                                                 
12  We thank Gary Simon for suggesting this approach. 
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 (10) 
Performing the risk concentration test for stock, combination, high-yield, and bond 
categories separately results in t-statistics equal to 3.02, 3.03, 0.63, and 2.8. The test 
across all fund objectives is 4.09. All are significant at the 1% level, with the exception of 
high-yield bonds. Another way of conceptualizing the extent of concentration of variance 
is to note that for 22 out of the 100 fund families in our sample every fund in the family 
was in the high or low variance group. High and low variances are more concentrated in 
families than would be expected by chance. 
VI. Conclusion 
Individual investors often restrict the mutual funds they select to the offerings of a single 
fund family. In addition, a common structure of 401K and 403b plans is that all the 
offerings are from one family. In this paper we show that this restriction causes investors 
to have higher risk portfolios than if they selected similar funds across different fund 
families. The principal reason for this higher risk is that funds within a family have 
higher correlation than if funds were selected from two families. This higher correlation 
holds for all ICDI categories involving stock and combination funds both when two funds 
are in the same ICDI category or when they are in two different ICDI categories. 
 Why does this increase in fund return correlation come about? When we split the 
increase in correlation between common response to market movements and increase due 
to residual correlation, we find that for most combinations more than 90% is due to 
residual correlation. Examining the effects of common holdings on the increase in 
correlation, we find about 60% of the increase in correlation is due to common holdings. 
Thus about 30% is due to a common response to factors other than the market, such as 
 18
industry and sector factors.  The surprising result of this analysis is the size of common 
holdings. Depending on the group examined, between 4% and 34% are held in common 
with a median within family holding of roughly 16%. 
 There is another source of risk in addition to the increased fund return correlation. 
High and low risk funds are concentrated in different families. While this doesn’t 
increase an investor’s average risk, it does increase the distribution of risk across 
investors. The increased distribution raises the probability of having a bad outcome by 
investing in only one family. Overall, the results suggest that investors would be wise to 
build portfolios of funds from different families, and that retirement plan administrators 
would do well to include offerings for more than one mutual fund family. 
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Table 1       
Mutual fund family summary statistics     
 Number  Number Median  Average Average 
Objectives Of Funds Of Families Per Family Maximum Return Risk 
Stock  384 94 3 29 0.21 7.30 
 Aggressive Growth 166 75 2 10 0.26 8.08 
 Long-term Growth 218 82 2 19 0.16 6.70 
Combination 275 83 2 18 0.23 4.49 
 Total Return 50 30 1 5 0.40 3.52 
 Growth and Income 128 65 1 9 0.19 5.48 
 Balanced 65 47 1 4 0.22 3.33 
 Income 65 47 1 4 0.17 4.38 
High Yield Bond 39 31 1 3 -0.08 2.67 
Bond 290 74 2 25 0.46 0.94 
 Ginnie Mae Bond 40 21 2 5 0.48 0.67 
 High Quality Bond 105 56 1 9 0.47 0.95 
 Municipal Bond 79 43 1 5 0.40 1.09 
 Government Securities 66 43 1 10 0.49 0.93 
All Objectives 988 100 6 85 0.28 4.47 
The table shows characteristics of the fund families considered in the study. The Stock, Combination, and
Bond objectives are decomposed into subcategories. The Number Of Families refers to the number of
families with at least one fund of that objective category. Median Per Family refers to the median number
of funds for the subset of families that offer a fund of that objective. Maximum refers to the largest number
of funds of that type for any family. Also reported is the average return and standard deviation for each
objective classification. The sample period covers 1998 through 2002, and the return and objective data are
taken from the CRSP mutual fund database. 
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Table 2       
Return correlations by objective within and outside fund families 
   Within Outside    
   Family Family  Percent Binomial
Objectives Obs Corr. Corr. t-stat Larger p-value 
Stock – Stock 77 0.774 0.734 3.70 0.714 0.000 
 Aggressive Growth – Aggressive Growth 41 0.780 0.738 2.49 0.634 0.030 
 Aggressive Growth – Long-term Growth 62 0.757 0.718 3.66 0.661 0.004 
 Long-term Growth – Long-term Growth 42 0.805 0.774 2.33 0.690 0.004 
Stock – Combination  78 0.757 0.709 4.71 0.667 0.001 
 Aggressive Growth – Total Return 28 0.710 0.706 0.26 0.536 0.286 
 Aggressive Growth – Growth and Income 48 0.695 0.660 2.50 0.667 0.007 
 Aggressive Growth – Balanced 39 0.719 0.681 2.57 0.718 0.002 
 Aggressive Growth – Income 22 0.644 0.631 0.68 0.636 0.067 
 Long-term Growth – Total Return 28 0.772 0.735 2.19 0.821 0.000 
 Long-term Growth – Growth and Income 52 0.793 0.757 2.26 0.673 0.004 
 Long-term Growth – Balanced 44 0.844 0.769 4.92 0.864 0.000 
 Long-term Growth – Income 26 0.740 0.716 1.17 0.577 0.163 
Stock – High Yield Bond 31 0.498 0.495 0.34 0.645 0.035 
Stock – Bond 70 -0.146 -0.142 -0.43 0.400 0.940 
Combination – Combination 55 0.835 0.766 5.32 0.782 0.000 
 Total Return – Total Return 10 0.839 0.731 2.73 0.800 0.011 
 Total Return – Growth and Income 23 0.766 0.734 1.25 0.696 0.017 
 Total Return – Balanced 16 0.777 0.760 0.69 0.750 0.011 
 Total Return – Income 16 0.769 0.719 2.16 0.625 0.105 
 Growth and Income – Growth and Income 30 0.857 0.805 3.11 0.767 0.001 
 Growth and Income – Balanced 34 0.868 0.799 4.05 0.824 0.000 
 Growth and Income – Income 20 0.845 0.809 2.63 0.800 0.001 
 Balanced – Balanced 12 0.920 0.832 3.52 1.000 0.000 
 Balanced – Income 18 0.824 0.803 1.10 0.611 0.119 
 Income – Income 4 0.859 0.836 0.40 0.500 0.313 
Combination – High Yield 31 0.476 0.472 0.48 0.484 0.500 
Combination – Bond 67 -0.147 -0.132 -1.69 0.403 0.929 
High-Yield Bond – High-Yield Bond 6 0.890 0.858 1.92 0.833 0.016 
High Yield Bond – Bond 30 0.009 0.007 0.15 0.567 0.181 
Bond – Bond 50 0.688 0.686 0.21 0.560 0.161 
 Ginnie Mae Bond – Ginnie Mae Bond 11 0.808 0.723 1.76 0.818 0.006 
 High Quality Bond – High Quality Bond 23 0.663 0.613 1.44 0.696 0.017 
 Municipal Bond – Municipal Bond 20 0.929 0.913 1.91 0.850 0.000 
 Government Securities – Government Securities 14 0.856 0.851 0.19 0.714 0.029 
The table reports average return correlations of funds within and outside fund families. Correlations are 
averaged first within families and then across families. The number of observations is the number of families 
with at least one pair of funds matching the objectives being considered. “Stock” refers to funds with 
Aggressive Growth or Long-Term Growth objectives; “Combination” refers to Total Return, Growth and 
Income, Balanced, or Income; “Bond” refers to Ginnie Mae funds, High Quality Bond, High Quality 
Municipal Bond, or Government Securities. The sample period covers 1998 through 2002, and the return and 
objective data are taken from the CRSP mutual fund database. 
 
 23
 
 
Table 3    
Influence of families on portfolio diversification 
  Number of Funds Added 
Current Objective Fund added 1 2 
 Stock  Stock 2 4 
 Stock   Combination 3 4 
 Combination   Combination 3 17 
 Combination   Stock 2 3 
An investor is assumed to start with one mutual fund and adds one or two funds from 
outside the family. The table shows the number of funds from within the family that are 
necessary to arrive at the same level of risk as adding funds from outside the family. 
“Stock” refers to funds with Aggressive Growth or Long-Term Growth objectives; 
“Combination” refers to Total Return, Growth and Income, Balanced, or Income. Fund 
variances are assumed to be the average for that objective classification as reported in 
Table 1, and return correlations for each objective inside and outside the family are taken 
from Table 2. The sample period covers 1998 through 2002, and the return and objective 
data are taken from the CRSP mutual fund database. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of the difference in fund return correlations inside and outside fund families 
  Return    
  Correlation Systematic Idiosyncratic 
Panel A: Two-factor model Obs Difference Comp. Comp. Ratio 
Stock – Stock 77 0.040 -0.004 0.044 1.10 
   Aggressive Growth – Aggressive Growth 41 0.042 0.001 0.041 0.98 
   Aggressive Growth – Long-term Growth 62 0.039 0.005 0.034 0.87 
   Long-term Growth – Long-term Growth 42 0.032 0.000 0.032 1.00 
Stock – Combination  78 0.048 0.000 0.048 1.00 
   Aggressive Growth – Growth and Income 48 0.035 0.012 0.023 0.66 
   Aggressive Growth – Balanced 39 0.038 -0.001 0.039 1.03 
   Long-term Growth – Total Return 28 0.037 0.007 0.029 0.78 
   Long-term Growth – Growth and Income 52 0.036 0.009 0.027 0.75 
   Long-term Growth – Balanced 44 0.075 0.000 0.075 1.00 
Combination – Combination 55 0.068 -0.004 0.072 1.06 
   Total Return – Total Return 10 0.108 0.006 0.102 0.94 
   Total Return – Income 16 0.050 0.000 0.050 1.00 
   Growth and Income – Growth and Income 30 0.052 0.010 0.042 0.81 
   Growth and Income – Balanced 34 0.069 0.003 0.066 0.96 
   Growth and Income – Income 20 0.036 0.008 0.028 0.78 
   Balanced – Balanced 12 0.089 0.046 0.043 0.48 
      
Panel B: Six-factor model      
Stock – Stock 73 0.036 0.008 0.028 0.78 
   Aggressive Growth – Aggressive Growth 36 0.037 0.007 0.030 0.81 
   Aggressive Growth – Long-term Growth 61 0.038 0.018 0.020 0.53 
   Long-term Growth – Long-term Growth 40 0.036 0.016 0.020 0.56 
Stock – Combination 75 0.058 0.030 0.028 0.48 
   Aggressive Growth – Growth and Income 44 0.033 0.022 0.012 0.36 
   Aggressive Growth – Balanced 36 0.034 0.015 0.019 0.56 
   Long-term Growth – Total Return 26 0.043 0.023 0.020 0.47 
   Long-term Growth – Growth and Income 50 0.036 0.020 0.016 0.44 
   Long-term Growth – Balanced 42 0.079 0.043 0.036 0.46 
Combination – Combination 52 0.075 0.031 0.044 0.59 
   Total Return – Total Return 8 0.127 0.053 0.075 0.59 
   Total Return – Income 12 0.040 0.017 0.023 0.58 
   Growth and Income – Growth and Income 28 0.050 0.025 0.025 0.50 
   Growth and Income – Balanced 33 0.078 0.044 0.034 0.44 
   Growth and Income – Income 17 0.047 0.024 0.023 0.49 
   Balanced – Balanced 10 0.103 0.070 0.034 0.33 
The idiosyncratic component of return correlation is measured by the average covariance of fund return 
residuals, scaled by the standard deviation of each fund’s returns; the systematic correlation is the correlation 
related to common exposure to return factors. Residual returns are obtained by regressing excess fund returns 
on the excess return of several index factors. The last column shows the ratio of the idiosyncratic component 
over the return correlation difference. Panel A shows the results for a two factor model, which includes the 
Value weighted CRSP Index (from Ken French) and the excess return on the Merrill Lynch aggregate U.S. 
Corp/Gov/Mortgage bond index. The six-factor model in Panel B adds equity size and value factors (SMB 
And HML), as well as mortgage and high yield indexes. The number of observations is the number of 
families with at least one pair of funds that matches the objectives being considered. Stock refers to 
Aggressive Growth and Long-Term Growth; Combination refers to Total Return, Growth and Income, 
Balanced, and Income; Bond refers to Ginnie Mae funds, High Quality Bond, High Quality Municipal Bond, 
and Government Securities. The sample period covers 1998 through 2002, and the return and objective data 
are taken from the CRSP mutual fund database. 
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Table 5 
Common stock holdings for funds within and outside fund families 
  Common Holdings  
  Within Outside  
Objectives Obs. Family Family t-stat 
Panel A: Percentage of total net assets     
Stock – Stock 47 0.133 0.056 3.51 
   Aggressive Growth – Aggressive Growth 25 0.139 0.029 2.72 
   Aggressive Growth – Long-term Growth 41 0.095 0.038 2.93 
   Long-term Growth – Long-term Growth 25 0.169 0.104 2.13 
Stock – Combination  49 0.149 0.071 4.28 
   Aggressive Growth – Growth and Income 25 0.040 0.029 1.46 
   Aggressive Growth – Balanced 18 0.059 0.024 1.76 
   Long-term Growth – Total Return 15 0.157 0.079 1.79 
   Long-term Growth – Growth and Income 29 0.222 0.129 3.66 
   Long-term Growth – Balanced 18 0.214 0.084 3.77 
Combination – Combination 30 0.274 0.128 4.77 
   Total Return – Income 5 0.176 0.081 1.96 
   Growth and Income – Growth and Income 14 0.236 0.174 2.69 
   Growth and Income – Balanced 14 0.340 0.119 4.55 
   Growth and Income – Income 6 0.272 0.150 2.01 
     
Panel A: Percentage of stock holdings     
Stock – Stock 47 0.144 0.060 3.50 
   Aggressive Growth – Aggressive Growth 25 0.145 0.030 2.79 
   Aggressive Growth – Long-term Growth 41 0.101 0.040 2.93 
   Long-term Growth – Long-term Growth 25 0.184 0.110 2.14 
Stock – Combination  49 0.184 0.083 4.29 
   Aggressive Growth – Growth and Income 25 0.042 0.030 1.47 
   Aggressive Growth – Balanced 18 0.092 0.034 1.87 
   Long-term Growth – Total Return 15 0.253 0.121 1.95 
   Long-term Growth – Growth and Income 29 0.236 0.136 3.58 
   Long-term Growth – Balanced 18 0.326 0.119 3.56 
Combination – Combination 30 0.404 0.163 4.50 
   Total Return – Income 5 0.251 0.121 1.74 
   Growth and Income – Growth and Income 14 0.250 0.184 2.71 
   Growth and Income – Balanced 14 0.546 0.167 4.31 
   Growth and Income – Income 6 0.328 0.169 2.02 
The table reports the average percentage of holdings in common for funds within and outside 
fund families. For each fund pair, the common percentage holdings are calculated as 
Σsmin(Xsi, Xsj) where Xsi represents the percentage of fund j’s holdings in stock s. Panel A 
calculates holdings as a percentage of total net assets, and Panel B reports holdings as a 
percentage of total stock holdings. The number of observations is the number of families with 
at least one pair of funds that matches the objectives being considered. Stock refers to 
Aggressive Growth and Long-Term Growth; Combination refers to Total Return, Growth and 
Income, Balanced, and Income. Fund holdings are taken from Thomson Financial and are 
measured in December of 2000. 
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Table 6 
Percentage of the difference in return correlation inside and outside fund families due to common 
holdings 
  Difference in Portion due to 
  Correlation Common Holdings 
Panel A: Percentage of stock holdings Obs Return Residual Return Residual 
Stock – Stock 47 0.039 0.036 0.44 0.48 
   Aggressive Growth – Aggressive Growth 25 0.041 0.042 0.27 0.27 
   Aggressive Growth – Long-term Growth 41 0.035 0.032 0.35 0.38 
   Long-term Growth – Long-term Growth 25 0.014 0.014 1.37 1.44 
Stock – Combination  49 0.051 0.053 0.43 0.42 
   Aggressive Growth – Growth and Income 25 0.010 0.014 0.58 0.44 
   Aggressive Growth – Balanced 18 0.058 0.049 0.33 0.39 
   Long-term Growth – Total Return 15 0.040 0.033 0.62 0.75 
   Long-term Growth – Growth and Income 29 0.040 0.030 0.47 0.62 
   Long-term Growth – Balanced 18 0.092 0.100 0.67 0.61 
Combination – Combination 30 0.074 0.066 0.89 0.99 
   Total Return – Income 5 0.056 0.040 2.11 2.96 
   Growth and Income – Growth and Income 14 0.018 0.015 1.15 1.38 
   Growth and Income – Balanced 14 0.126 0.135 0.94 0.88 
   Growth and Income – Income 6 0.038 0.036 0.66 0.69 
The table shows the influence of common stock holdings on the difference between fund return correlations 
within and across fund families. The influence of common holdings is measured by increased correlation 
over a benchmark portfolio with different stocks. The number of observations is the number of families 
with at least one pair of funds that matches the objectives being considered. Stock refers to Aggressive 
Growth and Long-Term Growth; Combination refers to Total Return, Growth and Income, Balanced, and 
Income; Bond refers to Ginnie Mae funds, High Quality Bond, High Quality Municipal Bond, and 
Government Securities. The sample period covers 1998 through 2002, and the return and objective data are 
taken from the CRSP mutual fund database. Fund holdings are taken from Thomson Financial and are 
measured in December of 2000. 
 
